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Eyewitness identification decisions from 1,039 real lineups in England were analyzed. 
Identification procedures have undergone dramatic change in the United Kingdom over 
recent years. Video lineups are now standard procedure, in which each lineup member is seen 
sequentially. The whole lineup is seen twice before the witness can make a decision, and the 
witness can request additional viewings of the lineup. A key aim of this paper was to 
investigate the association between repeated viewing and eyewitness decisions. Repeated 
viewing was strongly associated with increased filler identification rates, suggesting that 
witnesses who requested additional viewings were more willing to guess. In addition, several 
other factors were associated with lineup outcomes, including the age difference between the 
suspect and the witness, the type of crime committed, and delay. Overall, the suspect 
identification rate was 39%, the filler identification rate was 26%, and the lineup rejection 
rate was 35%. 
  




Predictors of eyewitness identification decisions from video lineups in England: A field 
study 
Introduction 
 Psychologists have been researching eyewitness identification for over a century 
(Münsterberg, 1908), attempting to understand factors that moderate identification accuracy, 
and to improve the techniques used to collect identification evidence. Much of this research 
has been carried out in the laboratory, where participants typically watch an event - either live 
or videotaped - and after a delay are shown a photographic lineup. Such research has 
contributed enormously to our understanding of eyewitness memory, and has led to 
significant improvements in the procedures used in the field (see Wells et al., 2000; Wells, 
Memon, and Penrod 2006).  
However, there are many aspects of a real eyewitness's experience that cannot be 
captured in the lab, ethically or practically. For example, eyewitnesses may experience 
significant distress during a real crime, and may experience a direct threat to their physical 
well-being. Furthermore, delays typically used in eyewitness experiments are relatively brief 
compared to delays often experienced in the field (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & 
Penrod, 2008). These discrepancies have prompted concerns over the generalizability of 
research from the lab to the field (e.g. Egeth, 1993).  
 Analyzing real cases is one way to bridge the gap between laboratory research and the 
field (e.g. Behrman & Davey, 2001; Memon, Havard, Clifford, Gabbert, & Watt, 2011; 
Valentine, Pickering, & Darling, 2003; Wright & McDaid, 1996). In such studies, large 
samples of real eyewitness identifications are collected and statistical models are used to 
predict the identification outcomes. The sacrifice of experimental control in field data, 
however, restricts the inferences that can be drawn. These inferences must be associative 




rather than causal (Wright, 2006). As a result, data from field studies must always be 
interpreted with caution, and with full awareness of the noisy, uncontrolled nature of the data.  
The procedures used by the police vary from country to country, as well as between 
jurisdictions within the same country, making it difficult to compare the field studies that 
have been conducted to date. For example, lineup presentation has varied widely across field 
studies, from live lineups (Slater, 1994; Valentine et al., 2003; Wright & McDaid, 1996) to 
photospreads (Tollestrup, Turtle, & Yuille, 1994), to video lineups (Memon et al., 2011), to a 
mix of several procedures (Behrman & Davey, 2001). Despite this, overall suspect 
identification rates have been remarkably similar across field studies, ranging from 36% 
(Slater, 1994) to 48% (Behrman & Davey, 2001)
1
. Filler identification rates, where reported, 
have varied between 20% and 24% (Valentine et al., 2003)
2,3
.  
The identification procedures used in England and Wales have changed greatly over 
the past ten years. At the time of Valentine et al.'s (2003) field study, most lineups in England 
and Wales were live. Now, the vast majority are presented via video, increasing the efficiency 
and decreasing the costs associated with lineups (Kemp, Pike, & Brace, 2001).  The video 
lineup consists of sequentially presented video clips, each lasting approximately fifteen 
seconds. Each clip begins with a frontal view of the head and shoulders of the lineup member. 
The lineup member turns to show each profile, and finally looks back at the camera. All clips 
are filmed under identical conditions, and are stored in a large database, making selection of 
fillers quick and relatively easy in most cases. According to the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 (PACE) Codes, which govern many aspects of policing in England and Wales, 
lineups must contain at least eight suitable fillers in addition to the suspect. Most forces in 
England and Wales use nine person lineups as standard, though some forces use larger 
lineups. Lineups are run in specialist „identification suites‟ by identification officers, who are 
not involved in any other aspect of the case.  




 The sequential nature of video lineups could safeguard innocent suspects against 
mistaken identification. A focus of much research over the past twenty-five years has been 
the sequential lineup (Lindsay & Wells, 1985), where in contrast to traditional simultaneous 
lineups, each lineup member is shown individually. The sequential lineup was developed to 
prevent witnesses from making relative judgments, in which the lineup members are 
compared against one another to find the „best match‟ to the culprit. Rather, the sequential 
lineup was thought to encourage absolute judgment strategies, in which each lineup member 
is directly compared to the witness‟s memory. There were several key features of the 
sequential lineup that were all believed to be important for securing identifications based on 
absolute judgments: the witness was unaware of how many individuals were to be in the 
lineup; the witness made a decision for each lineup member before moving on to the next; 
and the witness could not return to a previously rejected lineup member.  
 A recent meta-analysis showed that participants are less likely to choose from 
sequential than simultaneous target-absent (TA) lineups (Steblay, Dysart, & Wells, 2011). 
However, this may come at a cost to correct identifications from target-present (TP) lineups 
(see Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, 2009a, 2009b). Ebbesen and Flowe (2002) 
argued that witnesses become more cautious in general when viewing sequential lineups, 
making fewer choices from both TP and TA lineups. Debate continues about the robustness of 
the sequential lineup advantage and its policy implications (see Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & 
Goodsell, 2009; Lindsay, Mansour, Beaudry, Leach, & Bertrand, 2009a, 2009b; Malpass, 
2006; Malpass et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
 Since Lindsay and Wells‟ (1985) original demonstration of the sequential lineup, the 
basic procedure has been modified across different studies. In particular, the „stopping rule‟ 
has varied across different studies. Lindsay and Wells had their participants view all of the 
lineup members, even if a positive identification was made, and some other studies have 




followed suit (e.g. Carlson, Gronlund, & Clark, 2008; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001). One 
consequence of this stopping rule is that witnesses can identify more than one member of the 
lineup (although the witnesses may be warned that only the first choice will count). Some 
authors have argued that allowing multiple identifications can in fact provide important 
information about the reliability of a witness (e.g. Levi & Jungman, 1995). This is an issue 
that we will return to in the discussion. Other studies have terminated the procedure at the 
point when a positive identification is made (e.g. Flowe & Ebbesen, 2007; Sauer, Brewer, & 
Wells, 2008). Consequently, a witness who identifies a filler before the suspect appears in the 
lineup will not get a chance to view the suspect. For a fuller discussion of sequential lineups 
and the stopping rule, see Steblay, Dysart et al. (2011).  
The identification procedure used in England and Wales is quite different from the 
sequential procedure used in the lab in several ways: the witness knows beforehand how 
many individuals will be in the lineup; the witness must view the entire lineup twice before 
they can report a decision; and the witness can also view whole or part of the lineup again, 
freezing images as they wish. What effect would we expect these differences to have upon 
eyewitness identification decisions? Some jurisdictions in North America that have adopted 
sequential lineups allow multiple „laps‟ through the lineup, mainly due to concerns about 
reduced suspect identification rates using the sequential procedure (Klobuchar, Steblay, & 
Caligiuri, 2006; Steblay, Dietrich, Ryan, Raczynski, and James, 2011). Laboratory studies 
have found that additional lineup laps eliminate the benefits of the sequential procedure, as 
participants are able to compare the faces against one another in memory (Duckworth & 
Kreiner, 2009; Lindsay, Lea, & Fulford, 1991; MacLin & Phelan, 2007). Steblay, Dietrich, et 
al. showed that choosing rates increased from a first lap to a second lap, increasing correct 
identifications from TP lineups, but also increasing filler identifications from both TP and TA 
lineups. This effect was strongest for participants with a weak memory of the perpetrator, and 




for those who elected to view a second lap versus those who were required to view a second 
lap. Steblay, Dietrich et al. suggested that participants with stronger memories used the 
additional lap to confirm their original decisions, whereas participants with weaker memories 
lowered their decision criterion, frequently switching from lineup rejections to guesses, 
which were often of fillers. Similar findings were reported in a field study of sequential 
lineup procedures in Hennepin County, Minnesota (Klobuchar et al., 2006).   
However, this effect has not been replicated consistently. Lindsay et al. (1991) found 
an increase in false identifications only when the second „lap‟ was a simultaneous lineup, 
which was accompanied by a non-significant increase in suspect identifications from TP 
lineups. Wright et al. (2001) found that witnesses who had previously chosen fillers quite 
often switched to choosing the target in a subsequent simultaneous lineup, though they did 
not include a TA condition. Wilcock and Kneller (2011) compared video lineups conducted 
using the sequential procedure (terminating after a positive identification) with video lineups 
conducted using PACE Code procedure. When the target was present, the PACE lineups 
produced higher hit rates. When the target was absent, there were no significant differences 
between the lineup types. In their field analysis of Scottish video lineups, Memon et al. 
(2011) found that witnesses who requested additional laps were less likely to identify the 
suspect, and more likely to identify a filler than witnesses who did not request any additional 
laps.  
A central aim of this field study was to investigate the relationship between repeated 
viewing of a lineup and the ultimate identification decision. Identification officers recorded 
whether the witness made a decision after the mandatory two lineup laps, or whether they 
requested any extra views of the lineup, either whole or in part. Based upon the logic of 
Steblay, Dietrich, et al. (2011), we expect that witnesses who request additional lineup 
viewings will have weaker memories than witnesses who make a decision at the first 




opportunity. We therefore expect to see higher filler identification rates, possibly 
accompanied by lower suspect identification rates for these witnesses.  
Information was also collected on several characteristics of the witness and the 
suspect (sex, age, ethnicity). Robust in-group advantages have been demonstrated in the face 
recognition and eyewitness identification literatures (see Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & 
Sacco, 2010; and Sporer, 2001, for reviews). We therefore recorded whether the witness and 
suspect were of the same sex or from the same ethnic group, and the age difference between 
the witness and the suspect. In addition, we collected information on the type of crime 
committed, on the delay between the crime and the lineup, and on the suspect‟s position in 
the lineup. Finally, we recorded whether the witness was also a victim of the crime.  
The PACE Codes ensure a high degree of consistency in procedures between police 
forces in England and Wales. Therefore, the majority of the variables in this analysis were 
estimator variables, which are outside of the control of the legal system (Wells, 1978). Due to 
the uncontrolled nature of field data, and the inevitability of inter-correlations among the 
variables, we refrained from making any predictions about individual variables. However, the 
effects of many of these variables on eyewitness identification accuracy are discussed in 
depth elsewhere (see, for example, Lindsay, Ross, Read, & Toglia, 2007).  
 In any field study, there is an absence of „ground truth‟. It is difficult in most cases to  
say with certainty which suspects are guilty and which are innocent. Behrman and Davey 
(2001) recorded whether there was any corroborating evidence against the suspect, and 
whether that evidence was of „minimal‟ or „substantive‟ probative value. Suspect 
identification rates were higher when there was corroborating evidence of guilt than when 
there was no corroborating evidence, possibly because those suspects were, in fact, more 
likely to be guilty. The use of corroboration to estimate a suspect‟s guilt relies on the 
assumption of evidentiary independence. However, incriminating evidence from one source 




(e.g. confessions, DNA evidence) can influence the way in which other evidence is processed 
(Dror & Charlton, 2006; Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004). Even if 
information is available on corroborating evidence, field data must be interpreted carefully. 
Of the three possible outcomes from a lineup (suspect identification, filler identification, or 
lineup rejection), a filler identification is the only outcome for which accuracy is known
4
. 
Filler identifications are reported here, as in many field studies, as a useful index of guessing 
biases. Suspect identifications rates are also reported, though in the absence of ground truth, 
suspect identifications cannot be equated with accuracy (Wells, 2008).   
Method 
 A modified version of the questionnaire used by Memon et al. (2011) was developed 
with the guidance of a senior police officer. The questionnaires were completed by the ID 
Officer responsible for each lineup.  
Questionnaire composition 
The questionnaire was designed to create minimal work for the ID Officers. The 
questionnaire was kept to a single side of paper, and used multiple-choice tick boxes 
wherever possible. Questionnaire items were chosen if they could be answered quickly and 
easily, so many possible variables were excluded (such as weapon focus, alcohol intoxication, 
view of suspect). No information was recorded which would reveal the identity of the witness 
or the suspect. Where there were multiple witnesses and/or suspects to the same crime event, 
the ID officer was asked to indicate this clearly, and to attach related forms together.    
Sample 
Data from 1,575 lineups were collected. Cases in which the suspect was known to the 
witness and cases with missing data were excluded, leaving 1,039 cases in the final analyses. 
These cases included 606 distinct crime events with 740 suspects and 874 witnesses. Overall, 




the suspect was chosen in 406 cases (39.08%), a filler was chosen in 273 cases (26.28%), and 
the lineup was rejected in 360 cases (34.65%).  
 The data were collected from five specialist identification suites in England. Within 
each suite, one questionnaire was completed for every video lineup run over a three month 
period. The start dates for each suite were staggered, so the data collection began in 
September 2009 and ended in April 2010. The catchment areas for these suites included inner 
city and rural communities from geographically distant parts of the country, which varied 
widely in socio-economic demographics and in the types of crimes that were committed (see 
Table 1). Minority ethnicity witnesses accounted for 54% of the witnesses from Force 4, and 
just 4% of the witnesses from Force 2. Minority ethnicity suspects accounted for 73% of 
suspects from Force 3, and just 7% of suspects from Force 2.  Robbery rates also varied 
markedly, making up 45% of the crimes from Force 3, and just 3% of the crimes from Force 
2. The sizeable differences in suspect identifications (from 30% in Force 5 to 49% in Force 2) 
and filler identifications (from 23% in Forces 1 and 2 to 38% in Force 5) could be a reflection 
of these demographic variations. Of course, they could also be accounted for by a host of 
other unknown factors, such as differences in investigative strategies, which could produce 
different base rates of culprit-presence across the forces.   
 Results 
 Each lineup in the sample was assigned a unique trial code, and was also assigned a 
witness number, a suspect number, and a crime number. All trials that shared the same 
witness were given the same witness code (and trials sharing a suspect shared a suspect 
code). This allowed for the use of multilevel modelling (MLM). The lme4 package created 
for R (Bates & Maechler, 2010) was used, which is a freely available program for statistical 
analyses (http://www.r-project.org). 




MLM should be used on datasets in which cases are cross-classified (Wright & 
London, 2009). Within this dataset, witnesses were cross-classified with suspects. That is, the 
same suspect was sometimes seen by more than one witness, and the same witness sometimes 
saw more than one suspect. The data are therefore not independent, and it would be 
inappropriate to use traditional statistics which would assume independence. By using MLM, 
witnesses and suspects can be specified as random effects, where the regression intercepts are 
allowed to vary for each witness and for each suspect.  
The analyses were conducted using multilevel logistic regression. Two separate models 
were created, one for predicting suspect identifications, and one for predicting filler 
identifications. As the three lineup outcomes (suspect identifications, filler identifications, 
and lineup rejections) are not independent, only suspect and filler identifications were 
analyzed. We began with models containing the main effects of each predictor variable. These 
models contained ten categorical variables: Witness Sex, Witness Ethnicity (White, Black, 
South Asian, Other), Witness-Victim (Victim vs. Bystander), Suspect Sex, Suspect Ethnicity 
(White, Black, South Asian, Other), Own-Ethnicity (own-ethnic lineup vs. cross-ethnic 
lineup), Own-Sex (own-sex lineup vs. cross-sex lineup), Crime Type (violence, robbery, 
burglary, sexual offences, other offences), Lineup Position, and Repeat Viewing (no 
additional views vs. at least one additional view). There were also four continuous variables: 
Witness Age (years), Suspect Age (years), Age Difference (decades)
5
, and Delay (years). At 
each stage of the analysis, the variable with the smallest predictive value was removed, and 
the goodness of fit of the model was compared before and after removal of the variable. This 
process was repeated until none of the variables could be removed without significantly 
reducing the goodness of fit of the model.  
Odds ratios (ORs) are reported as measures of effect size for categorical variables. The 
odds of a given outcome (e.g. a suspect identification) are first calculated for each level of the 




comparison. For example, the odds of a suspect identification when the witness is female 
might be .50, and the odds of a suspect identification when the witness is male might be .40. 
The OR is the ratio between these two odds: in this case, .50/.40 = 1.25. This shows that the 
odds of a female witness choosing the suspect are 1.25 times higher than the odds of a male 
witness choosing the suspect. An OR of 1.00 shows that the odds are the same for both 
groups.   
Suspect identifications 
The most parsimonious model for predicting suspect identifications included five 
variables: Suspect Sex, χ2(1, N = 1039) = 7.17, p = .007; Suspect Ethnicity, χ2(3, N = 1039) = 
13.66, p = .003; Age Difference, χ2(1, N = 1039) = 39.87, p < .001; Crime Type, χ2(4, N = 
1039) = 11.66, p = .02; and Delay, χ2(1, N = 1039) = 4.88, p = .03. Table 2 shows the 
frequencies of suspect identifications across the three categorical predictors in this model.  
As Table 2 shows, female suspects were more likely to be chosen than male suspects, z 
= 2.80, p = .005, OR = 1.47. White suspects were more likely to be chosen than Black 
suspects, z = 3.78, p < .001, OR = 1.50. Robbery suspects were less likely to be chosen than 
suspects from any other group: Sexual Offences, z = 2.28, p = .03, OR = 1.48; Burglary, z = 
2.05, p = .04, OR = 1.35; Violence, z = 2.00, p = .05, OR = 1.46; Other, z = 3.23, p = .001, OR 
= 1.58. 
The association between delay and suspect identifications was negative, β = -0.59, SE = 
.33, p = .07, meaning that the likelihood of a suspect being identified decreased over time. In 
our sample, delay ranged from 0 days to 3087 days (almost nine years), with a median delay 
of 31 days. Suspect identification rates are plotted as a function of delay in Figure 1. For 
illustrative purposes, the cases have been grouped together into discrete delay periods. As the 
figure shows, the relationship was fairly weak and noisy. However, it is clear that the highest 
suspect identification rates were found within a couple of weeks of the crime, and the lowest 




suspect identification rate was for lineups conducted after a substantial delay (approximately 
six months or more).  
The association between age difference and suspect identifications was also negative, β 
= -0.52, SE = .08, p < .001. Age difference in our sample ranged from 0 to 70 years, with a 
median age difference of 7 years. Figure 2 shows suspect identification rates as a function of 
age difference. It is clear from Figure 2 that the likelihood of a suspect being chosen 
decreases as the age difference between the witness and the suspect increases. As the vast 
majority of the suspects were reasonably young (80% were under 30), most of the cases with 
large age differences involved older witness viewing younger suspects.  
Filler identifications 
 The most parsimonious model for predicting filler identifications included four 
variables: Witness Ethnicity, χ2(3, N = 1039) = 8.09, p = .04; Age Difference, χ2(1, N = 1039) 
= 4.43, p = .04; Crime Type, χ2(4, N = 1039) = 10.02, p = .04; and Repeated Viewing, χ2(1, N 
= 1039) = 62.19, p < .001. Table 3 shows the frequencies of filler identifications across the 
three categorical variables in the model. 
 Witnesses who requested at least one additional viewing of the lineup were almost 
two and a half times more likely to choose a filler than those who did not, z = 7.77, p < .001, 
OR = 2.40. White witnesses were more likely to choose fillers than South Asian witnesses, z 
= 2.63, p = .008, OR = 1.64. Fillers were more likely to be chosen by witnesses to violent 
crimes than to burglaries, z = 2.20, p = .03, OR = 1.18, or other types of crimes, z = 2.76, p = 
.006, OR = 1.37. 
 The association between age difference and filler identifications was positive, β = 
0.17, SE = .08, p = .03. This association is shown in Figure 3.  




Associations between predictors 
 To explore the relationships between the categorical variables, Cramér‟s V was 
calculated for each pair of predictors (see Table 4). Cramér‟s V varies between 0 and 1. 
Higher values reflect stronger relationships between the variables. As one would expect, 
many of the variables were associated with one another. Witness sex was strongly associated 
with own-sex identifications. This reflects the fact that the vast majority (over 93%) of the 
suspects were male. As a result, male witnesses were far more likely to view own-sex lineups 
(95.38%) than were female witnesses (11.42%). Own-ethnicity identifications were strongly 
associated with both witness ethnicity and suspect ethnicity. White witnesses, being the 
majority ethnic group in England, were much more likely to view an own-ethnic lineup 
(83.12%) than a cross-ethnic lineup (16.88%). Black witnesses were much more likely to 
view a cross-ethnic lineup (82.17%) than an own-ethnic lineup (17.83%), while South Asian 
witnesses viewed own- and cross-ethnic lineups with equal frequency within this sample. 
White suspects were more likely to be viewed by White witnesses (70.62%) than by 
witnesses from minority groups (29.37%). South Asian suspects were more likely to be 
viewed by witnesses from other ethnic groups (71.69%) than by witnesses from their own 
ethnic group (28.31%), while Black suspects were about equally likely to be viewed by 
witnesses from their own group (51.11%) and witnesses from other groups (48.89%). Crime 
type was moderately associated with most of the witness and suspect characteristics, 
indicating that there were demographic differences in the types of crimes that were 
committed and witnessed by people from different age, sex, and ethnic groups.  
 Bivariate correlations were run to examine the relationships between the continuous 
variables. The age difference between the witness and suspect was strongly correlated with 
the age of the witness (r = .77). This shows that the larger age differences typically involved 
older witnesses. Given that most of the suspects were relatively young (80% under 30, and 




33% under 18), this is not surprising. The high degree of multicollinearity between the age of 
the witness and the age difference between the witness and the suspect may account for why 
witness age was not a significant predictor of lineup outcomes.   
Discussion 
A central aim of this field study was to explore the relationship between repeated 
viewing of a lineup and the identification decision. In England and Wales, the PACE Codes 
state that witnesses must view the entire lineup twice before they are allowed to make a 
decision. They may request additional views of the lineup, either wholly or in part. We found 
that witnesses who requested at least one additional viewing of the lineup were two and a half 
times more likely to identify fillers than witnesses who did not request any additional lineup 
viewings. Filler identifications are known errors, which will not lead to prosecution of the 
identified party. Yet high filler identification rates cast doubt on the reliability of suspect 
identifications, as they suggest high guessing rates. Our findings are consistent with 
laboratory research, which has shown that additional lineup laps or the request to view the 
lineup again increase filler identifications from target-absent lineups (Duckworth & Kreiner, 
2009; Lindsay et al., 1991; MacLin & Phelan, 2007; Steblay, Dietrich, et al., 2011).  
There are two reasons why witnesses might request an additional lineup lap: to 
confirm a decision that has already been made, or to continue studying the faces until they 
feel that they can make a decision (Steblay, Dietrich, et al., 2011). Given that all of the 
witnesses had already seen the entire lineup twice, providing an opportunity for the 
confirmation of an initial choice, most of the witnesses who asked for additional viewings 
probably did so because they had been unable to make a choice previously. Ultimately, these 
witnesses were more likely to guess, possibly because their memories of the culprit were 
weak and they had strong desires to choose somebody from the lineup. This could have had 
devastating consequences if the lineup was, in fact, culprit absent, and the innocent suspect 




was chosen. There is clearly a need to review the current PACE Codes on repeated viewing of 
lineups. If witnesses are to be allowed additional views, then perhaps they should be asked to 
provide their reasons for why they would like to see the lineup again. This might help to 
distinguish between witnesses who wish to confirm a decision and witnesses who were 
unable to make a decision on the first two passes through the lineup (Steblay, Dietrich, et al.).  
In addition to the associations with repeated viewing, there were several other 
variables that predicted suspect and/or filler identifications.  For example, violent crimes and 
sexual offences were associated with the highest filler identification rates.  The stress 
associated with these crimes may moderate accuracy through physiological changes in the 
adrenological system. Stress-related decreases in identification accuracy have been 
documented in two field experiments (Morgan et al., 2004; Valentine & Mesout, 2009). Both 
studies found increased filler identification rates coupled with decreased accurate suspect 
identification rates under conditions of high stress (see Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & 
McGorty, 2004, and Pickel, 2007, for reviews of the relationship between arousal and 
identification accuracy). Our results fit with findings from field experiments, though we must 
refrain from drawing any causal conclusions. It is possible that culprit-present base rates 
differed for crimes that were more or less serious, due to differential allocation of police 
resources for more or less serious crimes.  
We found that suspect identification rates decreased and filler identification rates 
increased as the age difference between the witness and the suspect increased. However, as 
our suspects were reasonably young, most of the larger age differences involved older 
witnesses identifying younger suspects. The multicollinearity between age difference and 
witness age was very high, making it impossible to tease apart age-related declines from an 
own-age bias or  in-group advantage that has been reported in experimental studies  (Harrison 
& Hole, 2009; Memon, Bartlett, Rose, & Gray, 2003; Perfect & Harris, 2003; Wright & 




Stroud, 2002). This association may have been produced by a combination of social biases 
and cognitive and perceptual declines across the life span. Memon et al. (2003), for example, 
found that older witnesses were generally less accurate than younger witnesses, but that the 
magnitude of this difference was smaller when the suspect was of a similar age to the older 
witnesses (see also Havard & Memon, 2009).  
A key aim of introducing video lineups in England and Wales was to reduce the delay 
between a suspect becoming known and the conduct of an identification procedure by as 
much as possible (Kemp et al., 2001). The British police are doing an excellent job in this 
regard. In this sample, approximately 23% of lineups were conducted within one week of the 
crime, and a further 12% were conducted within two weeks of the crime. We found a 
significant association between delay and suspect identification rates, though the relationship 
was quite weak and noisy. Some previous field studies have found sharp declines in memory 
within days of the crime (Behrman & Davey, 2001; Tollestrup et al., 1994), while others have 
not found any significant association between delay and suspect identifications (Valentine et 
al., 2003; Wright & McDaid, 1996). While causal relationships between delay and memory 
are clearly evident in the laboratory (Deffenbacher et al., 2008), confounds with other factors 
(e.g. crime type, selection of witnesses) may obscure this relationship in the field.  
Sequential procedures in some studies and in some North American jurisdictions 
allow witnesses to make multiple choices from a lineup. Multi-choice lineups could allow 
investigators to attach appropriate weight to an eyewitness on the basis of their final selection 
(Levi & Jungman, 1995). A witness who identifies the suspect, and only the suspect, should 
be given greater weight than a witness who chooses the suspect and a filler. The PACE 
procedure provides no opportunity for multiple selections (though of course, a witness could 
say something like “it could be number 2 or number 5”), and it is difficult to envisage 
investigators being receptive to this idea, for fear of weakening positive identifications of the 




suspect (see Leippe & Wells, 1995, for a discussion of this issue). Yet the logic of multiple 
lineup choices is certainly compelling, and is deserving of empirical attention.  
Conspicuously absent from our set of predictor variables is witness confidence. 
Laboratory research has shown that, for choosers, confidence is positively associated with 
identification accuracy (Brewer & Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Weber 
& Brewer, 2004). Recording witness confidence at the time of the identification is crucial for 
assessing the reliability of a witness, as confidence is easily inflated by exposure to post-
event information (e.g. Wells & Bradfield, 1998). For this reason, recording witness 
confidence was a central recommendation of the National Institute of Justice Guidelines in 
the US (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). It was also a 
recommendation of the British Psychological Society (2007) to the UK Home Office for 
changes to PACE (http://www.bps.org.uk/downloadfile.cfm?file_uuid=32109AE2-1143-
DFD0-7E9E-4B5091B061CA&ext=pdf). However, the PACE Codes do not require officers 
to ask for confidence judgments. Therefore, unless a witness spontaneously makes some 
statement of confidence, there will be no record of initial certainty. This is clearly a serious 
oversight of the PACE Codes, as defence lawyers will be unable to detect post-identification 
inflations in confidence. In the high-profile case of Barry George, who was convicted and 
later acquitted of the murder of the British  television presenter Jill Dando, two witnesses 
who initially made „tentative‟ identifications of the suspect testified to being sure of their 
decisions in court (R v. George, 2002, EWCA Crim 1923). Had initial confidence judgments 
been recorded, the jury would have been aware of the uncertainty with which these witnesses 
had made their initial identifications.  
Field data such as those presented here can complement experimental data from the 
laboratory. Patterns of responding across large numbers of witnesses of diverse ages and 
ethnic backgrounds can be compared. Many of these witnesses will have experienced 




distressing events that could never be simulated in the laboratory. Of course, one must bear in 
mind the limitations of field data, including the absence of ground truth regarding suspect 
guilt (Wells, 2008), multicollinearity between variables, and potential confounds with 
unrecorded variables. These limitations highlight the need to avoid drawing causal inferences 
from field data (Wright, 2006). Nevertheless, these data add to our existing knowledge of 
eyewitness identification, while also raising questions for future research. 
In conclusion, this field study examined identification decisions from over one 
thousand real lineups conducted in England. We found clear evidence that repeated viewing 
of lineups increases guessing rates, which places innocent suspects at risk. We also found 
associations between lineup outcomes and a constellation of estimator variables. Of all 
identifications made within this sample, approximately forty per cent were of fillers. These 
data add to a growing body of research showing that witness guessing is not restricted to 
experimental situations with disinterested college students who know that their choices carry 
no consequences. The overwhelming evidence that has mounted up for the inherent fallibility 
of eyewitnesses is difficult to reconcile with the weight that justice systems continue to attach 
to this type of evidence. Social scientists and police forces should continue to work together 
in order to maximise the reliability of identification procedures in Britain and in the rest of 
the world.   
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1. Behrman and Davey‟s (2001) study included a large number of cases that had been referred 
to them. This method of sampling likely inflated the suspect identification rate in their 
sample.  
2. Memon et al. (2011) found a high filler identification rate of 41.9% in cases where the 
suspect was a stranger to the witness. This high filler identification rate may have been due to 
the wording of the questionnaire, which separated identification outcomes into: positive 
identification, negative identification, and no identification. While the “negative 
identification” category was intended to capture filler identifications only, some officers may 
have included lineup rejections in this category, inflating the filler identification rate. 
3. One notable exception to this pattern of results is the Illinois Pilot Program (the “Illinois 
study”), a year-long field experiment carried out in 2005 to assess the usefulness of the 
double-blind sequential lineup in practice (Mecklenburg, 2006). Suspect identification rates 
were at 60% for simultaneous lineups and 45% for sequential lineups and filler identification 
rates were very low, at 9.2% for sequential lineups, and just 2.8% for simultaneous lineups. 
However, Wells (2008) speculated that “tentative” filler identifications may not have been 
recorded, deflating the true filler identification rates. The Illinois study has also been heavily 
criticised on several other grounds (see Schacter et al. 2008; Spinney, 2008; Steblay, 2008, 
2011; Wells, 2008). Given the controversy over the Illinois Study, we do not discuss it further 
here. 
4. This will only be true if all fillers in a lineup are known to be innocent, as is the case in the 
UK and in most other jurisdictions. 
5. Age difference was coded as an absolute difference, irrespective of whether the witness or 
the suspect was older. Most of the suspects were young; therefore it was much more common 
to have an older witness and a younger suspect than vice versa.  





Table 1. Distributions of crime types, witness ethnicity, and suspect ethnicity across 
the five sampled police forces, along with suspect, filler, and nonidentification rates. 
Police force 1 2 3 4 5 
Lineup outcomes 
Suspect ID 40.54% 48.74% 33.73% 38.83% 30.12% 
Filler ID 22.52% 23.11% 27.71% 23.46% 37.95% 
No ID 36.94% 28.15% 38.55% 37.71% 31.93% 
Crime type 
Violence 40.54% 36.13% 32.53% 39.11% 45.78% 
Robbery 17.12% 2.52% 44.58% 32.40% 23.49% 
Burglary 10.81% 13.03% 8.43% 12.57% 10.24% 
Sexual Offences 0.90% 6.30% 4.82% 4.19% 4.82% 
Other 30.63% 42.02% 9.64% 11.73% 15.66% 
Witness ethnicity 
White 83.79% 96.22% 56.02% 45.81% 87.95% 
Black 7.21% 0.42% 17.47% 14.25% 0.60% 
South Asian 7.21% 0.42% 15.66% 33.24% 7.22% 
Other 1.80% 2.94% 10.54% 6.70% 4.21% 
Suspect ethnicity 
White 90.99% 92.86% 27.11% 41.34% 60.84% 
Black 7.21% 1.68% 60.24% 32.40% 18.07% 
South Asian 0.00% 0.84% 3.61% 18.99% 10.84% 
Other 1.80% 4.62% 9.04% 7.26% 10.24% 
  




Table 2. Percentage of suspect identifications and 95% confidence intervals, broken 
down by Suspect Sex, Suspect Ethnicity, and Crime Type.  
  
 
 N cases Percentage 
suspect ID 
95% Confidence intervals 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Suspect Sex 
Male 969 37.87% 34.51% 40.93% 
Female 70 55.71% 43.78% 67.64% 
Suspect Ethnicity 
White 616 44.16% 40.22% 48.09% 
Black 258 29.46% 23.86% 35.06% 
South Asian 94 36.17% 26.28% 46.06% 
Other 71 33.80% 22.53% 45.08% 
Crime type 
Violence 401 41.90% 37.05% 46.75% 
Robbery 254 28.74% 23.14% 34.34% 
Burglary 119 38.66% 29.78% 47.53% 
Sexual Offences 47 42.55% 27.88% 57.23% 
Other 218 45.41% 38.75% 52.07% 




Table 3. Percentage of filler identifications and 95% confidence intervals, broken 
down by Repeated Viewing, Witness Ethnicity, and Crime Type.  
 N cases Percentage filler 
ID 
95% Confidence Intervals 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Repeated Viewing 
Additional view(s) 489 38.04% 33.72% 42.35% 
No additional view 550 15.82% 12.76% 18.88% 
Witness Ethnicity 
White 725 28.69% 25.39% 31.99% 
Black 90 23.33% 14.43% 32.24% 
South Asian 166 17.47% 11.63% 23.31% 
Other 58 25.86% 14.25% 37.48% 
Crime type 
Violence 401 30.07% 25.66% 34.69% 
Robbery 254 23.23% 18.00% 28.46% 
Burglary 119 25.52% 17.29% 33.13% 
Sexual Offences 47 31.91% 18.08% 45.75% 

































Witness Sex        1.00 .198 .120 .126 .083 .062 .843 .292 .077 .073 
Witness Ethnicity  1.00 .196 .084 .246 .402 .138 .158 .122 .049 
Witness-Victim   1.00 .053 .157 .103 .119 .286 .043 .012 
Suspect Sex    1.00 .067 .015 .095 .098 .073 .016 
Suspect Ethnicity     1.00 .628 .062 .217 .120 .063 
Own-Ethnicity      1.00 .043 .251 .157 .004 
Own-Sex       1.00 .302 .097 .085 
Crime Type        1.00 .096 .077 
Lineup position         1.00 .067 
Repeat Viewing          1.00 





Figure 1. Suspect identification rates plotted against delay. 
Note: Data were grouped so that bins contained a similar number of cases (varying between 
71 and 87). Note that the bins span increasingly larger periods of time as delay increases, as 
there were fewer cases for any given delay. 
 
Figure 2. Suspect identification rates as a function of the difference in age between the 
witness and the suspect. 
Note: Data were grouped so that bins contained a similar number of cases (varying between 
74 and 111). Note that the bins span increasingly larger age ranges as age difference 
increases, as there were fewer cases for any given age difference. 
 
Figure 3. Filler identification rates as a function of the difference in age between the witness 
and the suspect. 
Note: Data were grouped so that bins contained a similar number of cases (varying between 
74 and 111). Note that the bins span increasingly larger age ranges as age difference 
increases, as there were fewer cases for any given age difference. 
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Figure 3. Filler identification rates as a function of the difference in age between the 
witness and the suspect. 
 
Note: Data were grouped so that bins contained a similar number of cases (varying 
between 74 and 111). Note that the bins span increasingly larger age ranges as age 
difference increases, as there were fewer cases for any given age difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
